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Marshner: Critique of Marian Counterfactual Formulae

A CRITIQUE OF MARIAN
COUNTERFACTUAL FORMULAE:
A REPORT OF RESULTS
This paper is devoted to refuting the so-called debitum hypotheticum or conditionatum. In general, a debitum is expressed by the claim that Mary, thanks to her connexion with
Adam, was under a necessity to contract original sin; the
debitum conditionatum is expressed by the claim that, thanks to
the same necessity, she would have contracted original sin, if
one or another condition had been fulfilled (e.g., if God had
not preserved her) .1
Thus the distinguishing characteristic of the debitum conditionatum is the need to use a contrary-to-fact condition (or
as it is nowadays called, a counterfactual) in order to express
it. Hence a promising way to refute this sort of debitum is to
make a critique of counterfactual conditional formulae in which
Mary's name appears; thus the title of the present paper.
The time is ripe for such a critique, because over the last
tWenty years logicians and philosophers of science have produced an important body of literature, and reached a substantial
consensus, on the meaning and truth-conditions for counterfactuals.2 Almost nothing of this work was available in 1954,
1 Robert Grosseteste was apparently the first to make the conditional
claim, whose other defenders include John Duns Scotus, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange (as of 1954), and Canon Rene Laurentin; for the citations, see ]. B. Carol, O.F.M., A History of the Controversy over the "Debitum Peccati" (The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1977).
Besides the authors who were prepared to defend only the conditional
claim, however, there have been hundreds of others who held it automatically, as an entailment of the stronger, unconditional debitum, proximate
or remote.
2 A complete statement of the problem and abundant bibliography will
be found in David K. Lewis, Counterfactuals (Harvard Univ. Press, Cam-
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when the debitum problem was solemnly debated at Rome and
enjoyed a brief vogue. 8 The fact that theologians have had
more fundamental questions to face since the Council is at least
one reason why the recent formal-logical achievements have
never been applied to the Marian debitum, which many theologians have considered an arcane (not to say trivial) matter in
any case. There is also another reason.
The recent work in formal logic is rather technical; it cannot be read without a certain amount of background in standard symbolic logic, model theory (or formal semantics), and
metamathematics. Unlike their medieval predecessors, today's
theologians have failed to keep abreast of the formal logic
of their own time, much less the semantics and related philosophical disciplines. The result is a pity and a headache. It
is a pity, because the predominantly hermeneutical concerns of
post-Conciliar theology need the tools of semiology.4 It is a
headache, because the theologian who does wish to exploit the
new resources is often unintelligible to his colleagues, and
few theological journals are equipped to print the standard
symbolic notations, which are taken for granted in the better
philosophical journals, and without which it is often impossible to proceed rigorously. 5
bridge, 1973); Robert C. Stalnaker, A Theory of Conditionals in Nicholas Rescher, ed., Studies in Logical Theory (Blackwell, Oxford, 1968);
Robert C. Stalnaker and Richmond Thomason, A Semantical Analysis of
Conditional Logic in Theoria 36 (1970) 24-42; for a differently based and
less complete, but in some ways more accessible, approach see Howard C.
Wasserman, An Analysis of the Counterfactrtal Conditional in the Notre
Dame Journal of Formal Logic 17 (1976) 395-400.
3 The proceedings of the Roman debate are in V gl 11, which appeared
in 1957.
4 Cf. the concllision of the present writer's article, Criteria for Doctrinal D,evelopment in the Marian Dogmas: An Essay in Meta-theology
in MS 28 (1977) 47-97.
5 The present paper, or rather what would have been the present paper,
is a case in point. The author prepared and announced for publication
(cf. MS 29 [1978] 135, 187) a fully-argued critique of the Marian
counterfactuals. It was couched in what the author hoped was a com-
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Now, before one launches upon the topic at hand, a word
or two of defense seems in order. Isn't the debitum peccati,
one may ask; a curiosity of pre-Conciliar theology? Is it not
eccentric to be discussing the thing today at all, much less
mastering the machinery of mathematical logic, to no better
purpose?
I should respond, first, that the debitmn is worth talking
about because it is an answer, albeit a flawed one, to two questions of abiding importance. The questions are: what is the
place of Mary in theological anthropology? And, in particular, how does the mystery of the Immaculate Conception illuminate, or qualify, an adequate theology of original sin? It
is no great exaggeration to say that the implicit answers to
these questions in the more familiar manuals are, respectively,
"none to speak of" and "not at all." The tracts on man and
grace proceed without a mention of the woman who was gratia
plena. The tract on original sin thrashes out the causes why
we have it-and scarcely notices that the same alleged causes
in Mary didn't produce it. One has to read the Mariologia
before discovering that maculism isn't true!
Has the situation improved since the Council? There are
influential quarters in which it has not. One would be hard
pressed to name works more widely respected, or more typical
of what is best in post-Conciliar developments, than those of
Maurizio Flick and Zoltan Alszeghy. But take in hand their
Fondamenti di una antropologia teologicci and the later volpromise idiom: formalization was kept to a minimum for the sake of
theological readers and yet not altogether excluded, so that an interested logician could at least see with fair accuracy what the critique
amounted to from the perspective of his own discipline. Alas, having
examined the manuscript, the editor of Marian Strtdies informed the author
that the projected article (a) would not be understandable and (b) would
cost the journal an exorbitant sum to print. Gradually brought round to
acknowledge the soundness of the editor's judgment, the author agreed to
see what could be done within the format of a smaller piece, reporting
rather than presenting the critique, and restricting itself to plain English.
Hence, after many false starts, the present paper and its subtitle.
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ume, Il peccato originate. One will look in vain for a chapter,
a page reference, or even a footnote on the un-Adamitic daughter of Adam, type of the new humanity.
There is no mystery about what lies behind these preposterous omissions. It is the deeply ingrained habit of thinking
that the Immaculate Conception is a fundamentally uninteresting "exception" to an otherwise profound theological pattern.
One invokes God's transcendent freedom and the radical unpredictability of grace in order to make of the Immaculate Conception nothing more than a delightful surprise. In effect one
holds that maculism is sound theory graciously belied by factmitigated, almost, rather than disconfirmed.
Now the debitum peccati is just exactly this ingrained prejudice, poured into a technical vocabulary and presented as a
distinct bit of theology. (Of course, for the Thomists after
Cajetan it was also something more; it was a labor-saving device which, when attached to the Immaculate Conception, guaranteed that Aquinas's treatise on original sin could stand without amendment.) If one objects that as a distinct bit of theology the debitum is recherche and something of a fossil, one
is largely correct; yet the thing is worth discussing, I am arguing, precisely because in the debitum the prejudice is out in the
open. Where the debitum is being asserted, the questions of
Mary's place in theological anthropology and of how the
Immaculate Conception impacts on the theology of original
sin are at least being answered. In a matter where the coherence of theology is at stake, a bad answer is better than none,
because it opens the way to debate. Such is my first response
in defense of the topic.
I have a second. If, as a distinct bit of theology, the debitum
is a fossil, nevertheless, as a deep prejudice articulated but not
exhausted in that bit of theology, the debitum is a ghost and a
dangerous one. As ingrained prejudice, the debitum ·is the
ghost of maculism. It continues to haunt theology wherever
theories of original sin are professionally elaborated without
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so much as a glance at the Marian counter-example.
Listen to the thesis of Flick-Alszeghy on the transmission of
· original sin (my translation) .
In this conception, the originating orig~nal sin consists in the
non-correspondence, on humanity's part, to its vocation of being the
mediator of salvation. Thereby, every individual who enters by
birth to become part of this humanity finds himself in a situation of
"dis-grac.e" both in ·an ontic sense (lack of sanctifying grace and of
the theological virtues) and in a personal sense (incapacity to opt
for God). 6

In this passage, 'humanity' does not refer to human nature precisively abstracted but to the race itself as a bio-historical community. The old infected flesh has been replaced by an infected
"situation," which is mankind's historical condition. "Everyone" born into this community in its present condition "finds
himself" in original sin, because the humanity which now exists
both inside him and around him fails to mediate salvation to
him. Now, shall we reason a little? We have a major premise
about everyone. As a minor, it is incontrovertible that Mary
entered by birth into the common humanity, which fails of
itself to mediate salvation. If the theory is correct, she ought
to have contracted original sin. The theory would not be asserted if it were not thought correct. Ergo the debitum. And
why be surprised? The debitum-prejudice is already contained
in the structure of the theory. Like a ghost waiting for a second
chance at flesh, the debitum is in the theory like a mistake waiting to be committed again.
sM. Flick and Z. Alszeghy, It peccato originate (Brescia: Editrice
Queriniana, 1972) 323. The passage is admittedly not as clear as one
would like. The authors do not say, in as many words, that entrance by
normal generation into the human race as we find it in history is the sufficient condition for the contraction of original sin. But this latter is certainly the most natural construal, and I have been unable to find a passage that is clearer or that serves to cast doubt on such a construal. A
great deal of contemporary theological writing seems almost to shrink
from clarity, but a full airing of that complaint would take us far afield.
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So, my second response is that the debitum, while dead in
the sense of being "out of print" as an explicit theory, is still
influential as a prejudice. In fact, its effects have grown worse
since the Council. Interest in Marian theology has declined
visibly among academic theologians. Every Marian truth other
than the divine maternity (and perhaps the virginal conception) has been thrust to the bottom of some "hierarchy" of
importance. Theologians of national stature have declared the
Immaculate Conception "obscure and remote from the heart of
the Christian faith." It is not uncommon to attribute these deplorable tendencies to an honourable cause: to Lumen gentium,
or to a change in devotional taste, or to a new theological
agenda prompted by ecumenism. But their real cause, I think,
is that same prejudice which for centuries has isolated certain
Marian dogmas as remote and irrelevant to the heart of Catholic theology. Hence it is reasonably clear that a renewal of
Marian theology (as distinct from Marian devotion) is virtually impossible until every articulated form of that prejudice
(i.e. every form of the debitum) has been confronted andrefuted. Those who think that a vigorous renewal of Marian
theology is desirable will therefore grasp the justification of
the present topic.
'Debitum,' like the Latin modal verb from which it derives,
is ambiguous. In a first usage, it indicates an obligation of the
civil order, as in debts and contracts. By an easy extension, it
is used to indicate an obligation of the juridical order, dealing
with what is enjoined by statute (whether or not the statute is
enforced in a particular case). Thirdly, by another easy extension, tdebitum' is used to indicate a moral obligation, attaching
to what is enjoined by conscience, by the Natural Law or by
divine justice. Native to the Biblical perspective is a combination of the first and third of these ideas into the notion of
"covenant" obligation. It will be convenient to group all of
these usages together under the label of juridico-deontic
debitum.
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Then, thanks in part to the confused thinking which treats
regularities of nature as though they were God-given statutes,
1
debitum' acquires another usage, in which it bespeaks physical
compulsion or causal necessity. In this usage, a thing "has to"
happen (debet accidere) just in case a condition sufficient for
that thing is fulfilled. This usage we shall label the nomological debitum. 1
Lastly, there is an important doxastic usage. A thing "ought
to be" the case if it follows logically from one of our beliefs.
For example, believing traffic conditions to be as usual on the
highway, we say that John ought to be home by 6 o'clock.
At 7:30, with still no John, we say in the light of the same
belief that John ought to have been home over an hour ago
( debuit). This 'ought to have been' expresses falsification of
a conseqttence of a belief (and hence falsification of the belief
itself, which is why, in the example cited, we begin to worry
that there may have been a traffic accident). This usage, which
is overlooked in the Mariological literature, we shall label the
doxastic debitum.
About these three sorts of debitum, in regard to their applicability to Mary, I have established in a previous article the
following conclusions. 8
7 By distinguishing the juridical usage of 'law' (statute) from the nomological usage (a "law" of nature), I do not intend to insinuate any grand
philosophical theses. I simply take seriously the following obvious differences. A law in the nomological sense is a formula which describes
an order-in-the-real, enters into the texts of explanatory theories, and
serves to predict the behavior of the real either deterministically or statistically. A law in the juridical sense is nothing of the kind: it does not
describe, it does not enter into a body of theory, and it does not serve
to predict. It is a directive or prescription addressed to public, free obedience, to which a sanction or penalty is attached. The careful drawing
and maintaining of this distinction does not presume an atheistical view of
nature, nor does it preclude the possibility of an oddly intermediate sort
of law (perhaps the Natural Law) which partakes of both sides.

a W. H. Marshner, A Logician's Reflexions on the Debitmn Contrabendi
Peccatttm, in .MS 29 (1978) 134-187.
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( 1) A juridico-deontic debitum COf!.trahendi peccatum makes
no sense whatever. The transmission of original sin is not a
matter of statute; for, even if there are "laws" involved, they
are certainly not the sort of laws which can be disobeyed; nor
can it be said that a "law of God" enjoins the contraction
of sin.9
(2) A nomological debitum peccati is at least of the right
kind. The regularities by which original sin is transmitted are
analogous to laws of nature in formal respects (see above, note
7). Nevertheless, a nomological debitum peccati which is unconditional (that is, one which is supposed to express a necessitation in the actu2.! world), such as the traditional "Thomistic" debitum proximum, is flatly impossible because self-contradictory. If one claims that every naturally begotten descendant
of sinful Adam necessarily contracts original sin, one is saying
that such descent is a sufficient condition for the contraction.
If one adds that Mary was under this necessity, one perforce
says that in Mary's case in the actual world a sufficient condition obtained for her contraction. If one then confesses the
Immaculate Conception, one contradicts oneself. It is contradictory to say that a sufficient con~tion obtained and that the
consequent did not obtain. It is preposterous to allege that
what did not happen was nevertheless necessitated. 10
DJbid., sections 1.4.1-9. In rejecting juridical accounts of original sin,
such as one finds in exemptionists like Montalbanus as well as in debitists
like Petrus Aureolus, contemporary theologians are virtually unanimous in
any case. One might suppose that a revival of the Biblical theology of
covenant would be helpful; after all, divine threats of historical disasters
are often part of the covenant as a sanction, so that once the covenant is
broken by man, the occurrence of these disasters can be said to be "enjoined" by God in some sense. However, these disasters are always of
the external economy of Providence (sufferings in the outward conditions
of life,' intended to inspire detachment and repentance) never of the
internal economy (distribution of interior graces). Hence, in the package
which we call "original sin," the element which resists the analogy of
covenant sanction is the key element of all, the privation of sanctifying
grace.
10 Ibid., sections 1.5.0-1.9.10. Logically speaking, the claim that a suf-
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(3) The doxastic debitttm, which posits nothing in the real
and 'simply expresses the' falsific~tion of a belief through the
falsification of one of the belief's entailments, exactly fits
the Mariological case. It explains why it does seem natural to
say that Mary "ought to have" contracted original sin.· In the
absence of a counter-example, the belief that every natural
descendent of sinful Adam contracts original sin seems to be
perfectly sound. In the light of that belief, Mary's contraction
was something to be expected. When in the course of theological events it was finally admitted that her contraction had not
happened, that belief (otherwise apparently well-founded)
was falsified; but the theologians who considered that belief
to be the exact an~ ~dequate expression of a revealed datum
refused to admit the falsification; hence they fell into the
•
incoherence already noted. 11
( 4) Nevertheless there is a coherent version of the debitum
which is not doxastic but nomological. It consists of two parts:
(a) one recognizes that a sufficient condition for the contraction of original sin did not obtain in Mary's case in the actual
world (hence she was neither obligated nor necessitated in
fact) ; but (b) one asserts that her case is sufficiently like the
rest of ours to justify this inference: if the relevant conditions
which obtain at our conceptions and which are sufficient for
ficient condition for original sin existed in Mary's case in. the actual world
is the primary feature of the debitum proximftm. The quasi-hylomorphic
account of why natural descent is such a sufficient condition, with its caro
infecta, is logically .secondary, even though historically it has been the
most prominent feature of this "Thomistic" theory. Therefore the incoherence of such a debitum remains even when the "infected flesh" is
replaced by something more plausible, such as a sinful "situation," in
the style of several post-Conciliar theologies.
The debitum remotmn, by the way (lest I seem to have overlooked that
protean solution), is at bottom nothing but the claim that Mary fulfilled
one or more necessary conditions for the sin's contraction. Logically, such
a claim establishes nothing about any sort of obligation or necessitation;
cf. ibid., sections 1.6.0ff.
11

Ibid., sections 1.6.2-7.
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)

cur contraction of sin had obtained at her conception, they
would have been sufficient in her case also and hence she would
have contracted original sin. This in a nutshell is the debit11m
conditionatum. One claims that it is possible to specify a condition under which it is true to say that Mary would have contracted original sin. And because the condition-to-be-specified
admittedly did not obtain in the actual world, the need for
counterfactual phraseology is evident.
It is often supposed that an assertion of this kind, involving
an unfulfilled (arid never-to-be-fulfilled) condition, is so
"iffev" as to provide even a zealous Immaculist with no motive
to refute it. Such complacency is mistaken; it rests upon the
~ssumotion that counterfactuals are about unrealities, or that
thev don't assert anvthing to be true, merely that something
wo11ld be true. On the contrary, it is evident that counterfactt.ials do assert something to be true because we often ·reject
them as false. For instance,
(1) If people didn't smoke, there wottldn't be any forest
fwes
is clearly false. Something in the structure of the actual world
makes it false (lightning,· among other things). Similarly, if
you accept
(2) If it weren't raininJ!. toniJ!,ht, I would go to the opera
as true, you accept something about my actttal preferences and
intentions. The same is true in theolo_gy. To take a slightly
absurd example, if we were so ill-advised as to accept
(3) If her mother had not been a saint, Mary wottld have
contracted ot"iJ!.inal sin,
we should be committing ourselves to a very odd theory of how
original sin is actuallv transmitted and of where Mary's case
fits in the actual scheme of things. 12 One may select a more
12

Gregory Palamas seems to have maintained that original sin could

be had by degrees, and that God therefore chose for Mary's ancestors a

line of increasingly just persons, so that the stain might be extinct in her
line by the time the Mother of God came to be conceived; see K. Soph-
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plausible protasis, of course; but whatever protasis one selects,
one is committing oneself to some theory. This is why the
debitum conditionatum deserves to be taken seriously as an
answer to the question about Mary's place in theological anthropology. I shall argue that it is a false answer, however.
Notice that, although the counterfactual conveys, if true,
something about the actual world, it does so in a roundabout
way. It posits an alternative course of events or alternative
"possible world" in which its protasis is true. How is this alternative world related to the actual world? It is related by what
we may call minimal alteration. Look again at
(2) If it weren't raining tonight, I would go to the opera.
This does not assert that whenever it fails to rain at night I
go to the opera, only tonight it is raining. Nor does it assert that, if only it weren't raining, I would go to the opera
tonight no matter what else might be the case. (After all,
what if there were a calamity?) No, it merely asserts that,
absent the rain, but all other curr.ently true conditions remaining as much as possible the ·same, I would go to the opera.
Thus the counterfactual posits a minimal alteration. Of course,
one can usually think of a number of ways in which this minimal alteration might be conceived, so that the counterfactual
protasis posits, in a typical case, a whole family of possible
worlds; but however many they may be, all those "worlds"
agree in this: they differ from the actual world "just enough"
and "only enough" to make the protasis true. Let us give such
minimally altered possible worlds a convenient name. Relative to each counterfactual protasis, let us call them the protasisworlds. For example, in
(1) If people didn't smoke, there wouldn't be any forest
fires,
the protasis-worlds are all those possible worlds which differ
from the actual world just enough to make it true that no one
okles, Tott en hagiois /Jatros hemon Gregoriott tott Palama homiliai kb'
(Athens: 1861) col. 945.
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smokes. Now, why is that proposition false? It is false because
in such worlds there is a lot of carry-over from the actual
world. Many facts and many principles remain true. In this
case, it remains true in the protasis-worlds that lightning
sometimes causes forest fires, and hence it fails to become
true in those worlds that there are no forest fires. By contrast,
( 4) If people didn't smoke, there wouldn't be any tobacco
shops
is true, because in the same protasis-worlds it remains true
that shops exist to supply a demand, and hence it becomes true
in those worlds that tobacco stores don't exist.
It is now easy to see why counterfactuals, by talking about
possible worlds, reveal the deep structure of the actual world;
they do so by means of the carry-over fact or principle, which
remains true because the protasis worlds are minimal alterations. It is also easy to see what is required for a counterfactual
to be true. The generalized example, 'if P were the case, Q
would be the case,' is true if and only if Q is true in every
protasis-world, where P is the protasis?3
There follows an important rule about truth in counterfactuals. The indicative formulae which we can disengage (desubjunctivize) from protasis and apodosis respectively have to
be able to be true together in the protasis-worlds. As logicians
say, they must be "jointly satisfiable"; otherwise the co~ter
factual cannot be true. The hope of a sentimental killer,
(5) Grandma would be happier if she didn't exist,
is preposterous, because, given the carry-over principle that
u Similarly, there is a weaker counterfactual which is expressed in
terms of 'might' rather than 'would.'; e.g., 'if it weren't raining tonight,
I might go to the opera.' This weaker counterfactual is true, if and only
if 'I go to the opera' is true in at least one protasis-world. The 'might'
counterfactual has been used sometimes in theology to express the socalled potentia natura/is peccandi,· it does not amount to a debitr1m of
any kind. For a modern example, see Candido Pozo, S.]., El Credo del
Pueblo de Dios: Commentario Teol6gico, 2nd. ed., (Madrid: Biblioteca
de Autores Cristianos, 1975) 136.
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one must exist in order to be happy, the statements 'Grandma
is happier' and 'Grandma does not exist' are not jointly satisfiable for the same grandmother.
We may now turn to face a more difficult problem. The
talk of possible worlds, and of statements' being true in possible worlds, is easy so long as one deals in common nouns.
But what happens when one speaks of particular persons, that
is, when one tries to project the bearers of proper names into
possible worlds? It is easy to see that there is a difficulty: in
the actual world, a woman is a prime substance with definite
accidents, and we can pick her out of a crowd, if worse comes
to worse, by pointing to her; in possible worlds, a woman is an
ens rationis to which we can ascribe any possible accident, so
that her identity becomes problematical_!'
14 The same is true in time. Before he or she exists, an actual person
is a possible person-an ens rationis, not an "individualized essence" and
not a spot of caro informis, infecta or otherwise.
Here is another powerful psychological basis, rooted in the imagination,
for the debitum's plausibility. One imagines God, a moment prior to Our
Lady's conception, thinking thoughts like these: "Mary is about to be
conceived; if I don't intervene by applying to her immediately the merits
of My Son, this person will contract original sin. My will is the contrary; therefore, I shall cause her to be conceived in grace, but I shall
know her as about-to-be-sinful-apart-from-my-act and hence as having
what several future theologians will call the debit11m peccati."
Such a train of thought is absurd, even apart from the anthropomorphism.
First, it assumes that Mary was about to exist anyway, thanks to natural
causes operating independently of her predestination. As we shall see, such
an assumption cannot be made lightly in the unique case of the Mother
of God.
Secondly (and more to the point of the present concern), such a train
of thought, once combined with the extractive sense of 'redemption' so
as to establish a debitttm, blurs to the vanishing point the distinction between the possible and the existent. The existent Mary is a substance
having individuating accidents and able to have others, having real potencies and exigencies. The possible Mary is nothing of the kind, being
an e11s rationis. At any moment prior to her actual conception, no matter
how close to that event the moment may be, 'Mary' therefore names an
ens rationis and not a person. Now it is perfectly clear that an ens rationis
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To see what form this difficulty takes in counterfactual
contexts, it is helpful to remind ourselves of why we bother
to make up counterfactual claims about individuals in the first
place. What do we gain by asserting or accepting
(6) If Joseph hadn't been granted a vision, he would have
ended the engagement quietly
as true? It seems to me that we gain information about th~
actual Joseph. He was shocked to learn of Mary's pregnancy;
cannot contract original sin in acttt exercito and cannot be in any "danger"
of doing so. But if such an ens cannot contract original sin, neither can it
be, in terms of real potencies and necessities, "about to contract" it. For no
agent is reasonably said to be about to do what it cannot do. Therefore
the future-tense sentence, 'Mary will contract original sin,' understood in
the sense of potency and act, is utter nonsense. It is not a meaningful
proposition about to be falsified by the event; it is a category mistake. For
that which the subject ('Mary') denotes at the moment of utterance cannot
be composed with the predicate alleged. Nevertheless, the imagination,
notoriously a poor guide in metaphysics, tricks one into thinking of an
already individualized essence waiting for the last touch of being. One
thinks of that last touch as transferring an already constituted individual
from potentiality to actuality. Thus the alleged dangers, subjections and
captivities of the possible Mary can become the debitttm peccati of the
actual Mary, as though the possible and the actual Maries were merely two
"states" of the same person! In reality, of course, there simply is no "one"
thing which both of them are. Hence it is preposterous to allege that the
possible Mary contracts a "debt" which the actual Mary retains because
the two are somehow the same thing.
These reflexions expose, I suspect, the real function of the caro infectaplus-mediate-animation for Thomist debitists who have understood well
the Common Doctor's teaching on the absolute priority of existence over
essence. Forbidden by that teaching from positing an already-constituted
essence as the possible Mary, they allowed some pre-animated matter,
peccaminously infected, to be the possible Mary. Its predictable causality
qua infected could then become her proximate debitum (cf. Cajetan, De
Conceptione B. Mariae Virginis ad Leonem X Pontiftcem Maximum in
Optucula Omni, Lyon, 1587, 139). But this expedient would face a
crippling difficulty even if one were to accept the idea of caro infecta.
It is this: if the human person has both a body and a soul, so that the
person does not exist until the human soul actually animates this matter,
producing hie homo, how can the pre-animated fetus be identified in any
way with the person? How can its infections, real or imaginary, constitute a debitttm in the person who doesn't even exist yet? Granted, the
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he was disposed to repudiate her; he did not wish to subject
her to public humiliation. We gain all of this information at
one stroke by allowing the-possible-Joseph-who-didn't-get-avision to stand as a counterpart to (or trans-world identity of)
the actual Joseph who did. By then thinking what is true of
the counterpart (he ended the engagement quietly), we grasp
something about Joseph.
If this account is roughly correct, what we demand of our
counterfactuals-about-individuals is relevance to those individuals and informativeness about them. How do we secure
these demands? Well, the informativeness is easy; we secure
it by requiring that the counterfactual not be tautological or
pre-animated matter can persist through a substantial change, acquire an
esse incompossible with its present esse, and so become the body of this
person; but the same can be said of any food-stuff. Shall we commit
the absurdity of saying that, theoretically, a person not already tainted by
original sin could acquire that sin by eating the flesh of a person who
had it, even if the cannibalism were not itself sinful? If one refuses to
accept such nonsense, how does one explain the alleged effect of the preanimated caro infecta on the person who simply makes that matter his
own by substantial change?
However, there is another way of talking about possible persons and
their contraction of original sin which avoids these gross mistakes. I can
say, with some assurance, for example, that if I have a third son, he will
contract original sin. I make no assertion this time about a substance and
its accidents, nor about potency and act. I am affirming nothing but a
logical connexion between a definite description ('my third son' and the
predicate, 'foreseen by God in solidarity with Adam,' which in turn (I
believe) entails 'contracts original sin' in acttt signato. All of the more sophisticated accounts of Mary's alleged debitum proceed in this way. They
posit an entailment between the indefinite description, 'a daughter of Adam'
and the predicate 'contracts original sin.' I have argued already that this
entailment cannot hold, because Mary falsifies it. Nevertheless, defenders
of the debitum in this more sophisticated sense are fully justified when
they say that the debitum, as they understand it, detracts not one whit
from the perfect sanctity of the actual Mary (d. the remarks of Joseph
A. de Aldama, S.J., in V gl 11, 476). The present writer is not arguing
against the debitum because it diminishes or casts a shadow over Mary's
sanctity (it doesn't) but because it misrepresents her place in theological
anthropology.
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analytic.I5 Relevance is more difficult; we secure it by re1s Tautological and analytic counterfactuals have to be excluded because, despite the fact that the names of individuals may occur in them,
they do not in fact reveal anything about anybody. For instance,

(7) If Mary had contracted original sin, she would have contracted
original sin

is not falsifiable, but it proves nothing about Mary. Similarly,
(8) If the square root of two had been even, it would have been divisible by two
·

reveals nothing, you must admit, about the "nature" of the square root
of two.
A well-known Marian counterfactual which fails to establish the debitum
by reason of being tautologous is Roschini's proposition:
(9) If Mary had been subiected to the law of original sin's transmission,
she would have contracted original sin.

(Cf. G. Roschini, Mariologia, 2nd. ed. [Rome, 1948], II, 89, note 1.)
Well, it pertains to the definition of a law that whatever a law predicts happens to anything subject to the law (that is, to anything which
fulfills the initial or boundary conditions of the law). Otherwise, the
"law" is not a law. Therefore, to say that, if x w·ere subject to a law,
what the law predicts would happen to x, is tantamount to saying that
the law is a law. Hence Roschini's proposition is a veiled tautology. That
it sheds no light on the debitum problem is obvious from the fact that it
cannot become false, no matter what name (try 'St. Michael' or 'Balaam's
Ass') is substituted for 'Mary.'
A similar problem renders uninformative the following:
(10) If God had so willed it, Mary wordd have contracted original sin.
It is axiomatic in theology that whatever God wills either absolutely or

under a fulfilled condition, happens. And vice-versa, whatever happens
has been willed by God either absolutely or under a fulfilled condition.
Therefore (10) cannot be falsified, simply because it is metaphysically
impossible that something willed by God efficaciously and consequently
should fail to happen. That (10) sheds no light on the debitum is clear
from the fact that it will not become false, no matter what is substituted
for Mary's contraction of sin as the volitrtm. Even an impossible volition,
e.g., if God had willed that the square root of two be a rational number,
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quiring that the possible individuals who exist in the protasisworlds be genuine counterparts of the actual individuals in
whom we are interested. The problem, _then, is this: when is
a possible person the counterpart of an actual person? What
requirements must the possible person meet in order to be
the counterpart (or trans-world self) of someone actual?
The answer, stated as non-technically as possible, has to
go something like this: one or more definite descriptions 16 of
which the actual person is the referent in the actual world, must
carry over into the protasis-worlds and must have the· possible
person as their referent in those worlds, if they have any referent at all. 17 But just which definite descriptions we shall
choose to carry over will vary from case to case.
For example, suppose that the individual in whom we are
interested is President Carter, and suppose that what we wish
to think about is what Carter would have done, if the Russians
had attacked China last year. In that case, we shall want the
definite description, 'the President of the U.S.,' to carry over
for Carter into the protasis worlds; that is, we shall require
that the counterpart to Jimmy Carter be the President of the
U.S. in every protasis-world in which_it is true that the Russians
does not falsify (10); for it is a rule of counterfactual logic that whenever the protasis is impossible, the counterfactual is trivially true. This
is so because, if the protasis is impossible, it posits an "absurd world,"
and in an absurd world anything goes. Hence it is trivially true that if
wishes were horses, this beggar would ride.
16 The term 'definite description' is a technical one; it means a descriptive phrase which can describe at most one object. In English, such phrases
usually begin with the definite article. Examples are 'the author of the
Eroica,' 'the father of Socrates,' 'the only surviving copy of Filmer's
Pa_triarcha,' or, in general, 'the so-and-so.' In Mariology, one relies heavily
on such definite descriptions as 'the Mother of God,' 'the daughter of
Joachim and Anne,' 'the person predestined to the Immaculate Conception,'
etc. ·
17 If the descriptions have no referent in a given possible world, we
shall say that the actual person has no counterpart in that world (would
·
not exist in that world).
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attack China in 1S>78.18 But suppose we w'ish to think about
what Carter would be doing today, if he had not won the
Presidency. In that case, we shall not want the definite description, 'the President of the U.S.,' to carry over for Carter; we
shall want another one to be controlling, e.g., 'the 1976 Demo- .
cratic Presidential nominee.' And if we want to think about
what he would have done if he had lost the nomination, we
must choose still a different description as controlling;· and
if the problem is what he would have done if he hadn't been
Goveri10r of Georgia, still a different one; and so on back,
until we have him in the womb. Beyond that point, we simply
run out of definite descriptions which could carry over. 19 That
1s Of course, thanks to the principle of minimal alteration, as soon as
'the President of the U.S.' carries over for Carter into the protasis-worlds,
all of the facts of his actual life up until his becoming President carry over
·
along with it; as far as possible.
1 9 It must not be imagined that as carry-over content is reduced at one
end, it fills back in at the other. The possible Jimmy Carter who lost to
Jerry Ford must not be required to have character-traits which the real
Carter has acquired only through the experience of the Presidency. The
possible Carter who was born black cannot be required to have any traits
of the real one, since even the identities of his parents would have to be
different. This amounts to saying that the real Carter has no black counterpart, in the technical sense of that term, about whom we can say anything.
Why, then, can we imagine someone's referring meaningfully to a
black Jimmy Carter? It is because in many cases we are not interested in
a genuine counterpart (or trans-world identical) of Carter but in an analog
of Carter. A black peanut processor with ambitions on the governorship
of a southern state would likely be called a black Jimmy Carter, that is,
a black analog of Carter. A Swedish tenor with a certain kind of voice is
a Swedish Caruso. Averroes is a Moorish Aristotle. Nureyev is a new
Nijinski. The woman who founds a new humanity is a new Eve. These
are all analogs, not counterparts. In order to establish analogs, one must do
three things: (1) one must pick a certain prominent property of the original bearer of the name, e.g. of Caruso; (2) one must define 'a Caruso'
as anyone who has that property, e.g. sings tenor with a certain style and
power; and thereby (3) one must turn 'Caruso' into a predicate (or an
indefinite description) rather than a proper name-a predicate which
works like a pros hen analogy, in which Enrico is only the prime analogate.
(For Aquinas's views on such a proper-name-turned-predicate, see S11mm-a
Theol. I, q. 13, a. 9).
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is why protases like these-'if Carter had been a Roosevelt,'
'if Hegel had been Japanese,' 'if Homer had written Catch-22'
-strike us as pointless, comical, or bewildering. We cannot
expect to learn anything pertinent to the actual people from
. counterfactuals which begin that way.
Now, to return at last to theology, what definite descriptions
whose referent is Mary in the actual world shall the defender
of the debitum conditionatum want to carry over into the protasis-worlds in which, allegedly, she contracts original sin?
It is certamly clear that he has to make a choice, because
there is at least one definite description which must not carry
over. I refer, of course, to 'the woman predestined to the Immaculate Conception.' For if we allow that description to carry
over, we require each counterpart of Mary to be that very woman, and so it turns out that Mary does not contract original sin
in any possible world whatever. For since God cannot fail,
slip up, or change His mind, it cannot possibly happen that
the woman predestined to that privilege (whoever she may be)
fails to receive it. So, if we are to get a true (non-analytic)
counterfactual whose apodosis is 'Mary would have contracted
original sin,' then, no matter what the protasis may be, the
description, 'the woman predestined to the Immaculate Conception,' must not be allowed to carry over from the actual world
into the protasis-worlds.
It is important not to allow the question about the debitum conditionatum
to be turned into a question about an analog of Mary. For it is surely
plausible to say that an analog of Mary is a woman perfectly free from
sin. So whoever contracts original sin is not "a Mary," and a Mary cannot
contract original sin. The inference is sound but irrelevant to the debitum
problem; for the actual person who was Mary was not necessarily a Mary.
The grace which she had was contingently hers, not essentially or necessarily so. Similarly, a Caruso has to be a great singer. Enrico has no analog
who can't sing. But Caruso was not necessarily a Caruso; if he had contracted asthma as a child, he would not have been a great singer; he has
a counterpart who can't sing.
In a word, the justifiable assertion that Mary has no analog who contracts original sin does not prove that she has no counterpart who contracts
it. The soundness of the debitttm conditional/1m turns upon the latter.
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In a word,
(11) if some condition, tp,' had been true, tthe woman predestined to the Immt!culate Conception contracts original sin' would have been tme
is false for any non-trivial condition whatsoever, because the
apodosis is impossible de dicto. 20
Next, it is highly probable in theology that another definite
description, 'the woman predestined to the Divine Maternity,'
must not be allowed to carry over either. I have in mind the
following considerations.
God is infinitely holy per essentiam. Therefore in every
possible world He is infinitely opposed to sin. The more intimate the relation in which a rational creature stands to Him,
therefore, the more stringently He requires holiness in that
creature. Atqui the Divine Maternity is the most intimate relation in which a human person can stand to a Divine Person.
Therefore, in all possible worlds in which someone is predestined to the Divine Maternity, God demands of whoever that
someone is the greatest holiness which He can demand of a
human person (consistent with her being redeemed). Now,
from what has happened it is valid to infer what is possible. A
degree of human holiness which includes immaculate conception is therefore possible (and is consistent with being redeemed). Therefore, in every possible world in which someone is predestined to the Divine Maternity, God demands of
that someone a degree of holiness which includes immaculate
conception.
This argument, as a theological ratio, is the all the more
convincing in that one cannot see a cogent objection to it which
is not an objection against the Immaculate Conception itself.
After all, one has distinguished company if one claims that an
20 On the sense of the term, see Alvin Plantinga, De Re et De Dicto in
NoriS 3 (1969) 235-258; Richmond H. Thomason, Modal Logic and
Metaphysics in Karel Lambert, ed. The Logical Way of Doing Things
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) 119-146.
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immaculate conception is impossible, that it conflicts with God's
arrangements in Adam, or that it conflicts with being redeemed
by Christ. But once the possibility and factuality of the Immaculate Conception are admitted, what form is left for an objection to take? Does the argument limit God's freedom? Hardly,
unless one wants to claim that God is "free" to be less holy
than He is, or to will less holiness in His creatures than He has
in fact willed. Does the argument give too much dignity to
the office of Divine Maternity? Hardly, unless the Catholic
understanding of that Maternity has been flawed since Ephesus.21 Does the argument make Mary's grace essential or inevitable in her? No, because the argument attaches the Immaculate Conception to the office of Theotokos, so that it remains to Mary an unexacted grace that she was chosen to fill
that office. 22
2 1 If a rather low view of the Divine Maternity seems plausible to most
Protestants, the reason may be not merely maculism but a profound misconception of the hypostatic union; see Yves Congar, Vrai et farme reforme
dans l'Eglise (Paris, 1950) 452; idem Le Christ, Marie et l'Eglise (Paris,
1952) 33-37.
22 Here is a different kind of objection, in the style of Ambrosius
Catharinus: one says that the argument overlooks the fact that the per- ·
son predestined to the Divine Maternity would have been deprived of the
privilege of the Immaculate Conception (hence would have been determined
to contract original sin), if God had chosen to allow His efficacious will
to continue to attain that person solely as one of the "many" included in
Adam.
I have answered this objection in a previous article, in a way which
stands up independently of whether Mary's predestination comes ante
or post praevimm lapsttm in the order of efficacious decrees in the order
of intention (A Logician's Refiexions in MS 29 [1978], sections 1.9.0-lO).
Briefly, I proved (1) that Mary never was included in Adam in the relevant sense of mystical solidarity with him as acting to keep or lose original
justice; (2) no elftcaciorts will of God could, under any priority, have
attained Mary solely "under the title" of solidarity with Adam in any
case; (3) even if, ahead of the efficacious decree establishing Mary's
supernatural privileges, there is in God a logically prior efficacious decree
determining her to exist in the natural order in these flesh and bones, descended from Adam post lapS1tm, nevertheless such a prior decree does not
constitute a subjection to original sin, because the conditions in which such
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These considerations (among others) seem to me to lend
an unimpeachable theological integrity to St. Pius X's famous
statement that God's Son had to preserve, or ought to have
·preserved ( debttis.re), His own mother from original sin. ~
The ratio theologica shows that more is at stake than an effusion of Papal piety. Plus, to say what God has to do, or even
ought to do, is strong speaking. More is at stake than an argumentum decentiae. I conclude, therefore, that this Pian thesis:
(12) Obligatorily, the Mother of God is immaculately conceived
(where the 'obligatorily' is taken as a de dicto modality) is
more probable in theology, if not indeed certain. 24
As a result, the defender of the debitum co12ditionatum cannot be certain that he has a true, non-trivial counterfactual on
which to base his case, unless he stipulates that the counterpart
of Mary (the possible Mary) who contracts original sin is
not the person predestined to the Divine Maternity.
In a word,
2

a decree posits Mary's existence are only necessary conditions (not a sufficient condition) for the contraction of original sin.
2 3 St. Pius X, Ad diem ilium, in ASS 36 (1904) 456.
24 This 'obligatorily' is just a one-word substitute for 'it ought to be the
case that.' As understood here, this oughtness differs from necessity in two
ways, formally and conceptually. Formally, the only difference is this:
whereas 'Necessarily p' implies that 'p' is true, 'Obligatorily p' does not
imply that 'p' is true. Otherwise the two notions have just the same formal
properties; e.g., 'Obligatorily p' is interchangeable with 'Not permissibly
not p,' just as 'Necessarily p' amounts to 'Not possibly not p.' Conceptually, the two notions differ in that whereas what is "necessary" is true in
every possible world which represents a fact-alternative, so to speak, to
the actual world, what is "obligatory" is true in every possible world which
represents a deontically perfect alternative to the actual world. Thus, if
the Pian thesis is true, a possible world in which the Mother of God is not
immaculately conceived (contracts original sin) is morally imperfect; toactualize it, impermissible.
:
Now since what is impermissible would never be done by a morally
perfect Being, we i:an transform the Pian thesis into a counterfactu.al formula
which will be more convenient to work with hereafter,· namely:· if Jhe-
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(13) If some condition, 1P,' had been true, 1the woman
predestined to the Divine Maternity contracts original sin' would have been true
is proqably false for any non-trivial condition whatsoever,·
because the apodosis is probably impossible de dicta.
This point is sometimes thought to be decisive against any
form of the debitum, but it is not. The debitum-defender ought
not to be troubled by it. The position to which the point is
fatal is maculism, and insofar as debitism is the ghost of maculism, of course, it is not surprising that debitists resist it.
Nevertheless, correctly understood, the debitum ought to have
nothing to do with the office of Theotokos; it should not claim
that this office is open to persons who contract original sin;
rather, the debitum is supposed to have to do with the person
who in fact held that office; it should claim that she might not
have held it and that, in that case, or at least in some case,
she would have contracted original sin.
But who is that person? What is the description which
must carry over from the actual world into the protasis-worlds,
so as to determine who counts as Mary in those worlds? So
far as I can see, this question has at most one plausible answer.
We are looking for a description which prescinds from all
special offices and singles out simply that physical person who
was named Mary. Clearly, the description we want cannot be
of the ostensive kind ('the object I am now pointing to') unless
we happen to be enjoying a private revelation. So what is left?
Well, it is standard practice in most societies to say who people
are .by stipulating who their parents are. And do theologians
have in mind by 'Mary' anyone other than the person conceived
by Joachim and Anne? Would the Mariological Society accept a paper on the sorrows of the "Cousin of Elizabeth" in a
possible world in which the cousin of Elizabeth was not the
had not been preserved from original sin, Mary would not have been
predestined to the Divine Maternity.
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daughter of Joachim and Anne? Then the conclusion is obvious: the description which must remain true of Mary in the
protasis-worlds is 'the person conceived by Joachim and Anne,'
and we may as well add 'at such-and-such a time.'
It is clear that if the defender of the debitum conditionatum
has a serious case to make at all, he must be able to stipulate
a condition under which the person conceived by Joachim and
Anne, devoid of all special offices, would have contracted original sin. I refute the debitum conditionatum by showing that
even this modest challenge cannot be met.
St. Ephraim the Syrian asked the question, "If God had not
become man, why would Mary have been created ?" 25 St. An. drew of Crete declared that if the Cross did not exist, Christ
would not have stood upon the earth, nor the Virgin. 26 St. John
Damascene addressed to 'the infant Mary these words: "Thou
shalt have a life higher than nature, but not for thine own sake.
Thou has been begotten for the sake of what thou shalt have
from God, for whose sake thou hast come into the world. " 27
If these Fathers are correct, one may paraphrase St. Paul and
say that, for her, to live was Christ in a stunningly literal sense.
The point being made is not the vacuous one that if there had
been no Incarnation there would have been no mother of the
Incarnate, but the strong one that there would have been no·
daughter of Joachim and Anne, no physical person Mary. It is.
in this sense that many scholastic Mariologists have understood
and defended the Patristic opinion. 28
25 St. Ephraim, Sermo de Transfiguratione Christi, cited by G. Alastruey..
Tratado de Ia Virgen Santisima, 4th ed. (Madrid, 1956) 64.
26 St. Andrew of Crete, Oratio de Crttce, cited by Alastruey, op.cit., 56.
27 St. John Damascene, Oralio de nativitate Virginis, cited by Alastruey..
op.cit., 64.
28 Alastruey, op.cit., 64-65; ]. A. de Aldama, S.]., Mariologia seu de·
Matre Redemptoris in Sacrae Theologiae Summa, 4th ed. (Madrid: BAC,
1961) III, 331, note 3, and "Scholion," p. 333; see also the final section
of Fr.]. B. Carol's study, Reflections on the Problem of Mary's PreservativeRedemption in this issue of MS, and the literature cited there.
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Now, in exact proportion as this opinion is probable, the
debitum conditionatum is improbable. If the former is certain,
the latter is untenable. No one can hold both without rejecting
the Pian thesis as impossible. Let us illustrate this logical conflict by taking as our sample way to assert the debitum conditionatum the late Fr. Balifs proposition:
(14) If she had not been preserved, Mary would have contracted original sin. 29
I reply with the Patristic thesis:
( 15) If she had not been predestined to the Divine Maternity, Mary would not have existed.
If he accepts this thesis, the debitum-defender must either
29 V gl 11 {1957) 499. In an earlier draft of this paper the author also
advanced an argument to the effect that BaliC's proposition is a thinlyveiled tautology. The argument turns on an interpretation of 'not preserved' which is slightly different from the one I shall use above, in the
body of the text. (It is not surprising that one should be able to find different interpretations; 'preserved' is a highly complicated predicate; one
might mean .five or six different things by denying it.) In the text, I shall
take 'not preserved' as equivalent to 'not predestined to be preserved' or
the like, that is, as not yet presupposing Mary's existence. Here, I take
it as indicating an already verified privation and hence as presupposing
Mary's existence; as soon as one does so, the following argument comes
into play.
The predicates 'not preserved from original sin' and 'contracts original
sin' and their negations, taken as verified by something present or absent
in an already existing subject, make sense only as affirmed of human beings.
In these subjects, preservation and non-contraction signify in the real
identically the same grace under the same intention (i.e., as repugnant to
original sin) ; their negations, non-preservation and contraction, both signify the absence of that grace under the same intention (i.e., as entailing
original sin). In this sense, not to be preserved means to lack grace, which
is the contraction of sin. In Mary already existing, therefore, her preservation is her non-contraction, and her contraction is the only thing which
could have counted as her non-preservation. Hence protasis and apodosis
in BaliC's proposition are identical. Notice that this is the only interpretation of these predicates which makes the proposition indubitable and that
it also makes it tautological. One may as well say that if she hadn't been
preserved, she wouldn't have been preserved.
Hereafter, in the text above, however, I follow a non-tautological interpretation.

Published by eCommons, 1979

25

Marian Studies, Vol. 30 [1979], Art. 11

Critiqrte of Marian Counterfactual Formulae

133

abandon his own claim, {14), or else be prepared to defend the
contradictory of the Pian thesis (i.e., permissibly the Mother
of God is not immaculately conceived), so as to be able to
assert:
(16) If she had not been preserved, Mary might still have
been predestined to the Divine Maternity. 80
This is not very safe; there is a powerful argument and a
Papal teaching against it, as we have seen. Nevertheless, the
debitum-defender cannot now afford to accept the Pian thesis;
for as soon as he does, it follows that
{17) If she had not been preserved, Mary would not have
existed.
And since 'Mary does not exist' and 'Mary contracts original
sin' are obviously not jointly satisfiable in any possible world,
( 17) entails that BaliC' s proposition is false-and when it
falls, the historic subjunctives of Grosseteste and Scotus fall
along with it:
{18) Mat'js soul was purifi.ed not from a sin which was
ev.er in her but from one which wo11ld have been in
her, if she had not been sanctified. 81
{19) For she wo11ld have contracted original sin by reason
of the common propagation, if it had not been prevented thro11gh the grace of the Mediator. 82
3 0 This is an example of the weaker, 'might' counterfactual; see above,
note 13. Notice that the relations of contradiction, contrariety, and subcontrariety between 'would' and 'might' counterfactuals form a traditional
square of opposition:

If 'P' had been the case,
'Q' would ha':'e been the case.

If 'P' had been the case,
'Q' would not have been.

If 'P' had been the case
'Q' might have been the case.

If 'P' had been the case,
'Q' might not have been.

31

Robert Grosseteste, Sermon on the Tota Prtlchra, ed. Ephrem Longpre,

O.F.M. AFH 26 (1953) 551.
s2 John Duns Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, lib. III, dist. 3, q. 1; ed. C. BaliC,
Ioannis Dtms Scoti Doctoris Srtbtilis ed Mariani Theologiae Marianae
Elementa (Sibenici: Academia Mariana Internationalis, 1933) 35.
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All thes·e counterfactuals assume that Mary would have existed,
grace or no grace, as someone whose existence was simply to
be given in the order of nature. But if the Patristic thesis is
true, Mary in the actual world has no such natural-Providential
existence; she has only a predestined existence. In a moment
I shall try to show the theological splendor of this thesis.
Before doing so, it is worth noticing that the debitum conditionatum collapses even if a weaker thesis is advanced against it.
Please go back to Fr. BaliC's proposition,

(14) If she had not been preserved, Mary would have contracted original sin.
This is true if and only if Mary existed and contracted original
sin in every possible world which differs from the actual world
just enough to make it true that Mary was not preserved. Let
us assume that the d.ebitum-defender, resisting the doctrine of
Pius X, thinks it safer to defend:
(16) .lf she had not been preserved, Mary might still have
been predestined to the Divine Maternity.
But if he thinks that (16) is safe, he must also accept its
subcontrary:
(16') If she had not been preserved, Mary might not have
been predestined to the Divine Maternity.
He now confronts the Patristic thesis. Suppose he will not
admit it but also declines to assert the opposite. Suppose he
It looks as though Scotus was misled by the following inference. Every
natural descendant of sinful Adam contracts original sin, unless it is
prevented. Mary was a natural descendent of sinful Adam. If it was not
prevented, Mary contracted original sin. Therefore, if it had not been
prevented, Mary would have contracted original sin.
This inference is fallacious. Please watch the following: Every victim
of assassination was killed by someone. Kennedy was a victim of assassination. If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, someone else did. Therefore,
if Oswald had not killed Kennedy, someone else would have.
Students of logic are indebted for this example to Ernest Adams, St~b
junctive and Indicative Conditionals in Fotmdations of Language 6 (1970)
89-94.
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admits only that the Patristic thesis might be true. Then we
have:
(15') If she had not been predestined to the Divine Maternity, Mary might not have existed.
But from (16') and (15') it already follows that
(17') If she had not been preserved, Mary might not have
existed,
and this already falsifies BaliC's proposition. From these premises one is entitled to draw no stronger conclusion than
(14') If she had not been preserved, Mary might have contracted original sin,
and this is no longer a debitum but a mere possibility.
Thus, even if one rejects St. Pius X's doctrine so as to assert
the less speculative-looking (16); still, so long as one admits
even the possibility of the Patristic thesis, the debitum conditionatum collapses. From that fact, one may infer what strong
measures are needed to save the thing: one must be prepared
to prove the very contraries of the Pian and Patristic theses,
namely, that Mary would have existed and would have been
the Mother of God regardless of the Immaculate Conception:
There is the exact prejudice I mentioned at the outset: one
theologizes as though the dogma of 1854 made no difference to
anything. But we are now in a better position to see what that
prejudice amounts to: it is a commitment (open or tacit) to
the contraries of the Pian or Patristic theses. And how, pray
tell, can that commitment be backed up? What principle would
make a proof of those contraries forthcoming? So far as the
present writer can see, the principle would have to be a claim
to the following effect: necessarily, if the supernatural presupposes the. natural, then every natural (overt, physical) aspect of every event which was or is to occur in world history
was efficaciously willed prior (logically) to any decree respecting grace and glory. This claim, far stronger than the traditional Thomistic teaching, is open to the following objection.
Surely, the miracles and other special effects of salvation his-
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tory would not have occurred unless salvation itself had been
intended by God, i.e., unless someone had been predestined to
grace and glory. Therefore, if the alleged principle is sound,
miracles either do not occur or else are natural coincidences
which would have occurred independently of their being assigned a salvific value by God or by the community of faith
as "signs." Transparently, this last is the Abbe Loisy's conception of the supernatural economy of revelation, not the Catholic
one. 33 So, since the one principle which, if sound, would make
a proof of the contraries of the Pian and Patristic theses forthcoming is demonstrably not sound, those contraries cannot be
proved, and the debitum conditionatum collapses.
Now having illustrated the logical power of the Patristic
thesis, I should like to conclude with a glance at its theological
power and at the magnificent prospect which it offers for a new
flowering of Marian theology, free at last from the shadow of
debitism and faithful to the perspectives of Lttmen gentium.
First, the Patristic thesis illustrates and deepens the parallel
between Mary and Eve-so much so that that parallel finally
fails without it. If God had decided not to make Adam, what
would have been the point of making Eve? If the raison d' etre
of Eve was to be helpmate for Adam, the raison d' etre of Mary
must be her role in the work of Christ. Hence it is hardly surprising that throughout the New Testament, Mary is so inseparable from the Incarnation that her existence is unintelligible without It.34
Secondly, the Patristic thesis illustrates and deepens the doctrine, taught in an especially solemn way by the Ordinary
sa "Le miracle est le train du monde et de Ia vie contemple par Ia foi,
qui seule· en penetre l'enigme; le meme train du monde et de Ia vie
observe en quelque sort du dehors par Ia raison est l'ordre de Ia nature,
le domaine de Ia science et de Ia philosophie," Loisy wrote, under the name
'Firmin,' in Les preuves et l'economie de Ia Revelation in Revrte du clerge
franrais (March 15, 1900) 128.
34 See the remarks of J.-B. Terrien, S.]., La Mere de Dieu et Ia mere
des hommes, 6th ed. (Paris, 1900) Livre II, c. 1.
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Magisterium, that Mary's predestination was joined with that
of Christ in rruno eodemque decreto.m 5 Now, no matter where
this one-same decree occurs in the order of efficacious decrees
in the order of intention, it is surely the case that Mary and
Christ are joined in it because they are to cooperate, e.g., as
mother and Son. But such cooperation requires at least partial
simultaneity of their existences in space-time. Mary has to
exist at the time the Incarnation will occur, if she is to cooperate with Christ as Theotokos or in any other way. Therefore the natural contingencies relative to the starting-point
of Mary's existence ought to be at the free disposition of God,
so that she might exist whenever, in the wisdom of God, the
blessed moment for the irruption of Eternity into time might
come. It is therefore inconvenient, to say the least, to suggest
that the fact and date of her existence were already set in concrete, so to speak, in the order of natural providence. Which
is more plausible, after all: that the Incarnation happened
when it did because that was where Mary was in time, or that
Mary existed when she did because that was where the Incarnation was in time? Or shall one escape the dichotomy by saying something that sounds even worse: given that someone
was to be predestined together with Christ in eodem decreto,
Mary was picked for the honor simply because she was the
future person in the order of nature who happened to be at
the right place at the right time?! No, the doctrine that Mary
and Christ were predestined together strongly supports the
Patristic thesis that Mary's existence was in a unique way in
God's hands, just as was the time to reveal the Mystery hidden from the ages, the time to begin the existence of the
Church.
A theology freed from the last traces of maculism by the
Pian and Patristic theses will finally know what to make of
.s5 Pius IX, lne!Jabilis Deus, ed. A Tondini, Le encicliche mariane, 2nd
ed. (Rome, 1954) 32; Pius XII, Munificentissimus Deta, D-Sch 3902.
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